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I. Introduction
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, numerous changes affected the
relationship between the federal government and Native Americans.'
Earlier in the twentieth century, Native Americans were subjected to a
policy of assimilation that forced Native Americans into broader American
society, often with substantial negative effects.2 The Reorganization Era
followed the Assimilation Era, and encouraged tribes to model their
governments after non-Indian organizations. Next, during the Termination
Era, Native Americans gradually lost their land through a series of
misguided government policies.4 The Termination Era eventually gave way
to the Self-Determination Era for Native American tribes, which largely
exists to this day. 5
An important piece of legislation that solidified the Self-Determination
Era was the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of
1975 ("ISDA").6 The ISDA gives individual tribes the opportunity to
administer programs previously controlled by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
("BIA") and other administrative agencies.
In addition to funding tribal programs, the ISDA requires the
government to fund Contract Support Costs ("CSCs").8 CSCs are indirect
tribal costs that the government normally would not incur.9 CSCs include
special administrative costs necessary for the responsible operation of a
business.10 However, the funding of CSCs is not without limitation. The
ISDA states that funding CSCs is "subject to the availability of
appropriations.""
In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled that government agencies must pay the
full amount of CSCs regardless of the "subject to the availability of
appropriations" language in the appropriation and ISDA. 12 While the courts
1. See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS

16-17 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the eras of tribal sovereignty).
2. Id at 9-10.
3. Michael C. Walch, Note, Terminating the Indian Termination Policy, 35
REV. 1181, 1183 (1983).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Seeid.at1188.
WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 16.
Walch, supra note 3, at 1191.
WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 17.
25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) (2006).
Id.
Id. § 450j-1(a)(3)(A).
Id. § 450j-1(b).
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 647 (2005).
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were in the process of deciding Cherokee, Congress inserted additional
language that placed a spending cap on the total amount of the
appropriations to be used to pay CSCs.13 The disparity between the
Supreme Court ruling in Cherokee and the legislative changes created an
issue of how to interpret CSC contracts with a spending cap when an
agency's funding ability may be limited.
Due to this conflict, in 2010 and 2011, two federal circuit courts of
appeal adopted opposing interpretations of the "subject to availability of
appropriations" language in situations where a spending cap is in place.
Arctic Slope Native Ass' v. Sebelius and the Tenth Circuit's Ramah Navajo
Chapter v. Salazar provided two distinct approaches to resolve the issue.14
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Ramah and issued an opinion in
favor of the tribes.' 5 Following the Supreme Court's Ramah opinion, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Arctic Slope, vacated the opinion, and
remanded the case to the Federal Circuit to be decided in light of the Ramah
opinion. 16 Due to the circuit split between the Tenth and Federal Circuits, it
was necessary for the Supreme Court to resolve the issue.
Successful resolution of this issue was vital. Unfunded CSCs exceed $1
billion.17 Furthermore, CSCs must be fully funded to ensure that mental
health clinics, hospitals, and substance abuse centers established because of
self-determination contracts continue to exist. Because CSCs are necessary
costs, tribes that receive partial CSC funding must divert money from
program funds in order to pay the remainder of their unfunded CSCs.
Non-Indian government contractors also had an interest in the swift
resolution of this issue. These decisions apply to both Indian and nonIndian government contracts. Had the Supreme Court not affirmed Ramah,
the government would not be required to fully fund any government
13. See, e.g., Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2000, 113 Stat. 1501A-148.
14. See generally Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 629 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir.
2010), cert. granted,judgment vacated, 80 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. June 25, 2012), abrogated
by Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012); Ramah Navajo Chapter v.
Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995, (2012), affd,
132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).
15. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012). In the interest of clarity,
the remainder of this comment will distinguish between the Supreme Court's Ramah
decision and the Tenth Circuit's Ramah decision.
16. Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, No. 11-83, 80 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. June 25,
2012).
17. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 132 S. Ct.
2181 (2012) (No. 11-531), 2011 WL 5145757 at *13.
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contract to be paid out of a capped lump-sum appropriation where the
phrase "subject to the availability of appropriations" is used in the contract
and the obligations are greater than the appropriation. Uncertainty created
by Arctic Slope drew sharp criticism by representatives of the business
community, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.18 The Chamber of
Commerce believed Arctic Slope harmed both government contractors and
the government itself.19
This comment will discuss the ISDA, foundational cases, provide
analysis of the recent Supreme Court decision in Ramah, and provide
recommendations for how Congress can successfully implement the Ramah
decision.
I. The RelationshipBetween Native Americans and the Federal
Government in the Twentieth Century
It is important to know the basic history of events leading up to the ISDA
to better understand its purpose. This history can be divided into four
"eras," each representing a different set of governmental policies toward
Native Americans during the twentieth century. 20 The four eras are the
Allotment and Assimilation Era, the Reorganization Era, the Termination
Era, and the Self-Determination Era.2'
A. The Allotment andAssimilation Era
The Allotment and Assimilation Era, spanning the late 1800s to the late
1920s, forced Native Americans into broader American society.2 2 The
federal government furthered its assimilative goals by allocating tribal land
to individual Native Americans.2 3 This created a "'checkerboard' pattern of
land ownership by tribes, individual Indians, and non-Indians, causing
serious jurisdiction[al] and management problems.",2 4 As a result of the
allotment process, Native Americans lost 65% of their land between 1887

18. See generally Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et
al. as Amici Curiae Support of Petitioner, Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 80
U.S.L.W. 3701 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-83), 2011 WL 3645402.
19. Id.
20. See generally WILKINSON, supranote 1, at 1-16.
21. Id.
22. Id at 9.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 10.
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and 1934.25 The government also increased efforts to assimilate Indians into
wider American culture. 26 While the Assimilation Era improved education
and health among Indians,27 the policy hindered cultural and religious
practices within Native American communities.28
B. The ReorganizationEra
Toward the end of the Allotment and Assimilation Era, Congress made
29
small but important changes to their relationship with Native Americans.
One of the most important pieces of legislation during this era was the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA"). The primary purpose of the
IRA was to encourage tribes to model their government after non-Indian
organizations. 30 While the IRA helped modernize tribal governments and
provided an effective vehicle to communicate with the federal government,
it alienated traditional Native American leaders.' One hundred and eightyone tribes approved the provisions of the IRA while seventy-seven did
not.32 Despite this significant opposition, the legislation nevertheless
affected all tribes and caused substantial changes to their organizational
structure over the ensuing years.33
C. The Termination Era
Due to discontent of Indians and non-Indians, the federal government
shifted its Native American policy away from IRA-era reforms.34 The
emerging era became known as the Termination Era.35 During the
Termination Era, Congress passed legislation that prevented "Indians in
terminated tribes from receiving any special treatment because of their
status as Indians."3 6 Any special programs and benefits enjoyed by Indians

25. Id. (explaining how individual Native Americans were granted land through a
twenty-five-year-long trust and how they often lost the land after the trust expired due to
"fraudulent transactions or tax sales").
26. Id.
27. Walch, supra note 3, at 1183.
28. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 10.
29. Walch, supra note 3, at 1183.
30. Id. ("Tribal governments were reorganized into either tripartite constitutional or
corporate forms, which strengthened the tribes but gave them a form foreign to Indians.").
31. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 12.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Walch, supra note 3, at 1185-86.
35. Id. at 1184-85.
36. Id. at 1188.
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and tribes ceased to exist.37 More importantly, many tribes lost their status
as sovereign entities. The negative effects of this era were quickly
realized. 39 Education levels, land ownership, and societal integration rapidly
declined after the Termination Era began.40
D. The Self-DeterminationEra and the ISDA
The government and Native Americans quickly realized the negative
effects of Termination Era policy. 4 1 Starting in the 1960s, another shift took
place.42
President Nixon accurately summarized the new SelfDetermination Era when he stated its goal was "to strengthen the Indian's
sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community."4 3
A central piece of legislation enacted during the Self-Determination Era
was the ISDA, passed in 1975." The Act aimed to give tribes a voice in the
planning and administration of Native American policies.45 The ISDA
shifted the administration of programs from the federal government to the
tribes. 46 The ISDA's long-term goal was full tribal management of all BIA
and Indian Health Services ("IHS") programs.4 7
There is a multi-step process required for tribes to receive full funding of
their respective Indian programs. The ISDA first requires tribes to enter into
self-determination contracts "for the planning, conduct, and administration
of programs or services which are otherwise provided to Indian tribes and
their members pursuant to Federal law.

...

Tribes submit this proposed

contract and it "shall, within ninety days after receipt of the proposal [be]
approve[d] . . . and award[ed] . . ." to the tribe. 4 9 The contract can be

denied for a few technical reasons; however, none of those reasons are at
issue in this comment.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1189.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 16.
43. Walch, supra note 3, at 1191 (quoting Presidential Message to Congress on Indian
Affairs, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOCs. 894, 894-96 (July 8, 1970)).
44. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 17.
45. Walch, supra note 3, at 1191.
46. Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 190 A.L.R. FED. 249, § 2 (2003).
47. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 17.
48. 25 U.S.C. § 450bj) (2006).
49. Id. § 450f(a)(2).
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0
The funds provided under the ISDA include CSCs.s The ISDA defines
CSCs as

the reasonable costs for activities which must be carried on by a
tribal organization as a contractor to ensure compliance with the
terms of the contract and prudent management, but which (A)
normally are not carried on by the [agency] . . . ; or (B) are

provided by the [agency] in support of the contracted program
from resources other than those under contract.51
The statute states that the CSCs shall be added to the other costs associated
with the self-determination contract.52
Every year, a tribe negotiates with the government to adjust the contract
amount based on its needs. Common CSCs include: depreciation of assets,
construction and mortgage costs, management studies, insurance and
indemnification, and interest expenses on capital.
Following several tumultuous decades in the early twentieth century, the
5
Self-Determination Era has been a period of relative success. The SelfDetermination Era has given Indians the opportunity and ability to succeed
as sovereign entities, celebrate their heritage, and exist within the larger
American culture.56 While not perfect, the continuation of the SelfDetermination Era and the ISDA are vital to the success of Native
American tribes.
III. Cases Leading Up to Arctic Slope and Ramah: Ferris and Cherokee
Arctic Slope and both Ramah decisions discuss the following cases at
length. As such, it is important to have an understanding of their holdings
57
and reasoning. The two cases discussed below are Ferris v. United States
58
and Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Leavitt.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. § 450j-1(a)(2).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 450j-1(a)(3)(B).
Id §450j-l(k).
WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 16.
See id.
27 Ct. Cl. 542 (1892).
543 U.S. 631 (2005).
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A. Discussion ofFerris v. United States
Ferrisestablished the basic rule regarding appropriations associated with
government contracts." In Ferris, an individual contracted with the
government to remove 100,000 cubic yards of earth within one year.60 He
was under the supervision of a government employee. 6 1 After removing
35,494 cubic yards of earth, the government ordered the contractor to stop
work for roughly six months. 6 2 The lump-sum appropriation ran out with
two months left in the original one-year contract and with five months of
unfinished work.6 3
Neither side disputed that the work stoppage was the government's fault
or that the contractor went unpaid throughout the entire stoppage.6 The
contractor brought suit arguing he was entitled to payment for the five
months of unfinished work.65 The government argued that the contractor
was only entitled to payment for the two remaining months on the
contract.66
The court ruled for the contractor stating, "a contractor who is one of
several persons to be paid out of an appropriation is not chargeable with
knowledge of its administration, nor can his legal rights be affected or
impaired by its maladministration or by its diversion, whether legal or
illegal, to other objects."6 The court reasoned that appropriations may be
limitations on what government agents can spend, "but [their] insufficiency
does not pay the Government's debts, nor cancel its obligations, nor defeat
the rights of other parties."
Ferris protected government contractors by establishing that lump-sum
appropriations will not go unpaid due to insufficient or ill-managed
appropriations. Government contracts are still contracts and thus parties
must fully perform, even if one of those parties is the government.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See generally Ferris,27 Ct. C1. 542.
Id. at 545.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 545-46.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.
Id
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol37/iss1/6

No. 1]

COMMENTS

211

B. Discussion of Cherokee v. Leavitt
The facts of Cherokee are similar to those in Arctic Slope and Ramah and
the case was vital to the Supreme Court's ultimate decision in Ramah.
69
Cherokee combines two separate but factually identical cases. The first
case was brought by the Shoshone-Paiute and the Cherokee Nation under
the Contract Disputes Act ("CDA") of 197870 against the Department of the
Interior ("DOI").7 1 The DOI denied their claim in an administrative
proceeding. 72 The tribes then brought a breach-of-contract claim in federal
district court. The district court ruled for the government and the Tenth
Circuit affirmed.74
The second case also involved the Cherokee Nation.75 The tribe again
submitted claims to the DOI, which were initially denied.76 The Board of
Contract Appeals reversed and ordered the government to pay $8.5
million.77 The government appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision for the tribe.7 8
The government's initial argument was that self-determination contracts
are "unique, government-to-government" agreements and are different than
normal procurement contracts. 79 Because tribes should know the
government has entered into identical contracts with multiple tribes, tribes
should bear the risk that they will not receive full payment.o
Using the ISDA as authority, the Court quickly rejected this argument.
The ISDA's text "suggests that Congress, in respect to the binding nature
of a promise, meant to treat alike promises made under the [ISDA] and
normal contractual promises."82 In defining the nature of promises made
under the ISDA, the act uses the word "contract" 426 times.83 A contract,
69. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 635-36 (2005).
70. Id. See generally 41 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
71. Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 635-36.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 636.
74. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 1054 -(10th Cir. 2002);
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (E.D. Okla. 2001).
75. Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 635-36.
76. Id. at 636.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 638.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 638-40.
82. Id. at 639.
83. Id.
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the Court reminded, is "a promise or a set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy . . . ."8 The Court further analyzed

Congress's intent and determined there was nothing to suggest that tribes
should bear the risk of underpayment."
Next, the Court discussed the meaning of the phrase "subject to the
availability of appropriations."8 According to the Court, the phrase
traditionally meant that potential contractors could negotiate with the
government before the beginning of the fiscal year, but the contract would
not become binding unless Congress appropriated funds.
Because
Congress actually appropriated sufficient funds in this case, the traditional
interpretation did not assist the government's case. The Court also
dismissed the government's next argument: that the appropriations
provision affirmatively allows agencies to adjust funding levels based on
the amount of money they receive from Congress.89
To be successful, the Court stated that the government must either show
why the appropriations provision does not deserve its traditional contractrelated interpretation or prove that Congress intended another meaning.90
The government failed to persuade the Court of either possibility. 9'
Although there was evidence that agency employees wanted to retain
discretion to appropriate underfunded appropriations as they saw fit, the
Court found no evidence that Congress acknowledged those desires within
the ISDA or the appropriations themselves. 92
Ferris and Cherokee provide the backdrop to analyze both Ramah
decisions and Arctic Slope. Ferris and Cherokee introduce established
principles in contract law when dealing with government agencies and were
vital to the Supreme Court's decision in Ramah.
IV Discussion of the Circuit Split: Arctic Slope & the Tenth Circuit's
Ramah
In late 2010 and early 2011, the Tenth and Federal Circuits of the United
States Court of Appeals reached opposite conclusions on the issue of
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979)).
Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 639-40.
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id. at 643-44.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id.
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whether the government is liable for underfunding CSCs with the existence
of a statutory cap. In Arctic Slope, the Federal Circuit ruled that the
government was not required to pay Arctic Slope Native Association
("ASNA") the difference between the contracted amount and the
appropriated amount.94 The Tenth Circuit reached a different opinion in
Ramah when it ruled that tribes are entitled to unfunded CSC costs.95
This section of the comment will discuss the analysis found in Arctic
Slope and Ramah. These opinions are important because they created a
circuit split that was recently resolved by the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court resolved the competing positions of these two
cases by accepting Ramah for certiorari and issuing an opinion.
A. Discussion of Arctic Slope v. Sebelius
Arctic Slope concerned self-determination contracts made between
ASNA and the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS").9 7
These contracts allowed CSCs to be used for the tribe's health clinics.98
Similar to other cases discussed in this comment, the appropriation made by
Congress was insufficient to pay the full amount of all contracts entered
into by DHHS. 99 The contract had the "subject to the availability of
appropriations" provision 00 and the appropriation passed by Congress also
stated that the amount spent on CSCs was "not to exceed" the amount that
Congress appropriated. o

The "not to exceed" language distinguished this case from Cherokee.'02
The court noted that "not to exceed" is often used to show Congress intends
to limit the amount of money available for a given purpose.103 This is often
called a binding statutory cap.'
93. See generally Arctic Slope Native Ass'n v. Sebelius, 629 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir.
2010), cert. granted,judgment vacated, 80 U.S.L.W. 3059 (U.S. June 25, 2012), abrogated
by Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012); Ramah Navajo Chapter v.
Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012), affd,
132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).
94. Arctic Slope, 629 F.3d at 1304.
95. Ramah, 644 F.3d at 1073.
96. See Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012).
97. Arctic Slope, 629 F.3d at 1298.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1299.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1300.
102. Id. at 1301.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1302.
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ASNA did not deny that a statutory cap was created by Congress's
appropriation.'0 Instead, the tribe argued that the cap only applies to a
"line-item appropriation for a single contract" and because the
appropriation was large enough to pay the full amount for the contract with
ASNA, the tribe is entitled to full payment.10 6 ASNA relied on the
previously discussed case, Ferrisv. United States, to support its position. 10 7
Unfortunately for ASNA, the Federal Circuit recognized important
distinctions between the contracts at issue here and the contracts in Ferris.
The court ruled that the "subject to the availability of appropriations"
provision is in the ISDA and self-determination contracts in order to
overcome the Ferrisrule. 08 The court believed the appropriations provision
put tribes on notice of possible insufficient appropriations, and in doing so,
made the tribes responsible for knowing the status of the appropriations.' 09
The court conceded that Ferris would apply in a situation where the
agency had the ability to reallocate funds from another source to fulfill the
contractual obligation."10 However, the court ultimately held this
reallocation of funds did not apply with the statutory cap in place because
the government could not reallocate funds without exceeding the amount
specified by the cap."'
The court also noted that the ISDA says a tribe's funding should not be
reduced in order to provide funding to another tribe.1 2 The Federal Circuit
interpreted this provision to mean there would be no other permissible way
for the government to allocate money among the tribes." 3
B. Discussion of Ramah v. Salazar
In Ramah, the Tenth Circuit provided detailed analysis in support of its
conclusion that tribes are entitled to the unfunded portion of their CSCs.114

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1303 ("[W]here the appropriation covers multiple contracts, the contractor
may sue for breach if the appropriation is sufficient to cover the contract at issue, even if not
sufficient for all purposes.").
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1304.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id
114. See generally Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2011).
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In contrast with the Federal Circuit in Arctic Slope, the Tenth Circuit held
that the rules from Ferrisand Cherokee apply."5
The pertinent facts in Ramah are identical to those in Arctic Slope. The
contracts in question contained the "subject to the availability of
appropriations" provision and funding was "not to exceed" the specified
amount.116 The Tenth Circuit analyzed the ISDA from the light most
favorable to Native Americans.' According to the Tenth Circuit, when
interpreting an ambiguous statute, courts should adopt the interpretation
favoring Indians rather than follow the traditional rule of deferring to
executive agencies."' 8 Therefore, "if the [ISDA] can reasonably be
construed as the Tribe would have construed it, it must be construed that
way."'"9
The arguments made by the government and the tribes were also similar
to the arguments made in Arctic Slope. The government argued that the
provision "subject to the availability of appropriations" necessarily limits
the tribe's funding to a pro rata share to be divided equally among all CSC
contracts.12 0 Ramah countered that the government's ability to pay an
individual CSC contract is what matters.121 If the appropriation is sufficient
to pay an individual contract, the appellant argued, the agency should be
required to fulfill the terms of that contract.12 2
The court discussed three concepts fundamental to their opinion. First,
when Congress makes a lump-sum appropriation, it is inferred that there is
no restriction on how the funds should be spent.123 Second, the court
rejected the notion that "because of mutual self-awareness among tribal
contractors, tribes, not the Government, should bear the risk that an
unrestricted lump-sum appropriation would prove insufficient to pay all
contractors."l 24 Finally, if Congress appropriates enough money to pay a
contract, the agency must pay the contractor even if they earmarked the
funds for other obligations.125
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
1997)).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1075-76.
Id. at 1057-59.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 640 (2005)).
Id.
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Consistent with Cherokee, the Tenth Circuit decided that the
appropriations at issue were indeed lump-sum appropriations because the
appropriations were "made to cover a number of specific programs,
projects, or items."l2 6
Next, the court found that the "not to exceed" provision did place a cap
on the overall amount of available funding, but was not as large of a
distinction as the Federal Circuit found in Arctic Slope.12 7 According to the
court, using explicit language such as "not to exceed" is not the only way to
establish a cap.12 8 For example, the Cherokee appropriation gave an explicit
amount of money "for expenses necessary to carry out" programs and CSC
contracts.12 9 The Tenth Circuit found that both provisions have the same
legal effect.130 Since the Supreme Court, in Cherokee, ruled that the
government was still bound to CSC contracts, the Tenth Circuit found that
the "not to exceed" language should not affect the outcome of the case.
The court also upheld the rule from Cherokee that appellants must be
paid in full regardless of whether the appropriations were used to pay other
contracts legally available for that purpose.' 3 '
Next, the court reviewed the following language from the ISDA:
agencies are "not required to reduce funding for programs . . . serving a
tribe to make funds available for another tribe ... ."132 The court turned the

government's argument on its head. When appropriations exceed the total
amount of money in CSC contracts, the agency will necessarily reduce
funding from one tribe to another.133 The pro rata system is simply one
method of reducing funding, and as a result, no tribe receives the total
amount for which they contracted. 1 34
The Tenth Circuit's main problem with the government's case was that it
characterized "over 600 tribes and tribal contractors" as a single entity. 35
As evidence of this view, the court found that the only cases the
government cited in support of its position were line-item appropriations for
one obligation instead of a lump-sum appropriation for multiple
126. Id. at 1068 (quoting 2 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONs LAW 6-5 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter GAO REDBOOK]).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.; see 2 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 126, at 6-29.
Ramah, 644 F.3d at 1068.
Id.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1069-70 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §450j-1(b) (2006)).
Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id.
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contracts.1 36 Ferrisdoes not apply to single contract appropriations and the
court does not believe that these examples should supersede the rule set out
in Ferrisand further developed in Cherokee.
The court concluded its opinion with a discussion of remedies and the
government's options for the future. The government argued that paying the
tribes would violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.' The
court agreed that the shortfall could not come from the CSC appropriation,
but instead must come from the Judgment Fund, through the CDA." The
CDA governs disputes arising out of contractual relationships with the
government.13 9 The CDA explicitly applies to self-determination contracts,
and the money for judgments on those contracts comes from the Judgment
Fund.140 Paying the tribes out of the Judgment Fund ensures they receive
the full amount of CSC funding under the contract while avoiding any
constitutional issues.
V The Supreme Court's Ramah Decision
In 2012, the Supreme Court accepted Ramah for certiorari. 141 Because of
the circuit split regarding the appropriations issues discussed above, it was
necessary for the Supreme Court to be the final arbiter of the matter.
42
In Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter,1
the Supreme Court settled the
circuit split between the Tenth and Federal Circuits. In its opinion, the
Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision in Ramah and ruled that the
government is required to pay the full amount of CSCs when Congress
appropriates a sufficient amount of funds to pay one tribal contractor but
not enough to pay all tribal contractors. 14 3
The Court discussed the impact of Cherokee and Ferris on the case and
concluded that these cases "dictate the result."'" The Court highlighted a
136. Id. at 1070-71.
137. Id. at 1076; see U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7 ("No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law .....
138. See Ramah, 644 F.3d at 1077.
.
139. See 41 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).
140. Ramah, 644 F.3d at 1076 (stating that this is not the most efficient system to pay the
full amount for each contract, and probably not what Congress intended. The court states
that they "must consider the legal effect of Congress' intentional acts, and those acts compel
[this] result."); see 25 U.S.C § 450m-l(d) (2006); 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006); 41 U.S.C. §
612(a) (2006).
141. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012).
142. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2186 (2012).
143. Id.
144. Id. at2190.
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few points. First, the government's obligation is no different than any
normal contractual obligation1 4 5 and "if the amount of an unrestricted
appropriation is sufficient to fund the contract, the contractor is entitled to
payment even if the agency has allocated the funds to anotherpurpose or
assumes other obligations that exhaust the funds." 4 6 Second, the Court
emphasized the rule from Ferris, that contractors need not know the status
of a lump-sum appropriation. 14 7 In the case of a lump-sum appropriation,
"[c]ontractors are responsible for knowing the size of the pie, not how the
agency elects to slice it." 48
The "not to exceed" provision was the only significant difference
between the facts in Ramah and Cherokee: however, the Court agreed with
the Tenth Circuit and ruled that the language did not preclude the tribes
from recovery.14 9 The Court stated the "not to exceed" statutory cap is no
different than the language in Ferris.soThis is because "[w]ords like 'not
to exceed' are not the only way to establish a maximum limitation. "'' As
such, the agency was able to distribute funds from the lump-sum
appropriation in any manner it chose.'52
The statutory cap did not restrict the manner in which the agency could
distribute funds. It did limit the amount of funds in the appropriation that
could be used to pay the tribes' CSCs.1 53 However, "when an agency makes
competing contractual commitments with legally available funds and then
fails to pay, it is the Government that must bear the fiscal consequences, not

the contractor."154
By affirming the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court resolved a
complicated circuit split and provided certainty for Native Americans as
well as all government contractors. The Court upheld the spirit of Ferris
and Cherokee and has reinforced the contractual nature of CSC agreements
under the ISDA.

145. Id. at 2188 (citing Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 639 (2005)).
146. Id. (quoting Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 641).
147. Id. at 2189.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. The restriction in Ferris stated: "For improving Delaware River below
Bridesburg, Pennsylvania, forty-five thousand dollars." Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch.
181, 20 Stat. 364).
151. 2 GAO REDBOOK, supranote 126, at 6-29.
152. Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2192.
153. See id.
154. Id. (emphasis added).
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VI. Analysis of Ramah
The Supreme Court made the correct decision in Ramah for three
primary reasons. First, CSC contracts are separate contracts with separate
obligations. Although Congress made one large appropriation to pay the
CSC contracts, hundreds of obligations remained in existence. Second, the
appropriations at issue were unrestricted, lump-sum appropriations. As
such, agencies had complete discretion to determine how to allocate the
money. Finally, the traditional meaning of the phrase "subject to the
availability of appropriations" and the reasoning from Cherokee and Ferris
apply.
A. Agencies Have Individual ContractualObligationsto Each Tribe That
Enters into a Self-Determination Contract
A primary factor that supports the Court's analysis is that the agreements
at issue are contracts. The ISDA leaves little room to doubt that Congress
intended these agreements, "in respect to the binding nature of a promise,"
to be ordinary contractual promises and not special government-togovernment agreements.'5 5 This is evidenced by the fact that the word
"contract" is used 426 times to describe the agreement between the tribes
and the government in the ISDA. 156 Additionally, CSC agreements are
specifically referred to as "self-determination contracts" within ISDA.1 7
More importantly, because tribes enter into their own, separate CSC
contracts, the government has an obligation to fully perform each contract.
If any particular contract is breached, the government can be held liable
under the CDA.158 This legislation provides a mechanism to compensate
contractors for breaches by agencies if no other funds are available.15 9
B. Legal Availability
1. Legal Obligations
Agencies were obligated to perform by paying the amount of each
contract out of a lump-sum appropriation. Lump-sum appropriations are

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 639 (2005)
Ramah, 132 S. Ct. at 2188 (citing Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 639).
25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(1) (2006).
25 U.S.C. § 450m-l(d) (2006).
Id.
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funds used to pay for "a number of specific programs, projects, or items." 6 0
Absent a specific statutory provision, agencies have the discretion to
determine how to allocate funds from an appropriation.16 1 "[C]ommittee
reports and other legislative history as to how funds should or are 16expected
2
to be spent do not establish any legal requirements on the agency."
The statutory cap imposed by Congress does not alter the fact that an
agency is free to determine how to allocate the money appropriated for CSC
contracts. The reasoning from In re Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. applies. In Newport News, Congress appropriated a statutorily
capped $244 million, out of a larger $3.16 billion, to the Navy for a
shipbuilding program.16 3 Congress's legislative history and committee
reports showed that out of the $244 million, $152 million was for the
construction of one ship and $92 million for another. 164 However, this intent
was never explicitly included into the appropriation and as such, was not
binding on the Navy. Because the appropriation did not state how the funds
were to be divided, the Navy had discretion on how to allocate the funds.
As the Supreme Court correctly stated, the present cases are no different.
Congress appropriated money to pay for obligations arising out of CSC
contracts with Indian tribes. However, the appropriations contain no
language dictating how the money should be divided among the hundreds
of CSC contracts. Congress could have easily avoided this issue by simply
entering a provision into the appropriation requiring a pro-rata distribution
at a specified rate, or even better, by identifying a specific amount to be
paid to each contract.16 5 But Congress did not do so. The effect is that
agencies were free to determine how to fulfill their obligations without
congressional restrictions.

160. 2 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 126, at 6-5; see In re Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 55 Comp. Gen. 812, 1976 WL 13166 (1976) (stating that an appropriation to
fund as little as two separate obligations is considered a lump-sum appropriation.).
161. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993).
162. Id. at 192-93 (quoting LTV Aerospace Corp., 55 Comp. Gen. 307, 319 (1975)
("Congress is well aware that agencies are not legally bound to follow what is expressed in
Committee reports when those expressions are not explicitly carried over into the statutory
language. . . . [A]n agency is not free simply to disregard its statutory responsibilities:
Congress may always circumscribe agency discretion to allocate resources by putting
restrictions in the operative statutes.").
163. 2 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 126, at 6-14 (citations omitted).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 6-15.
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2. When Did Funds Became Legally Available
Funds became legally available to pay the tribes when Congress
appropriated funds for the year. Three criteria must be met before funds
from an appropriation are legally available:
1. the purpose of the obligation or expenditure must be
authorized;
2. the obligation must occur within the time limits applicable
to the appropriation; and
3. the obligation and expenditure must be within the amounts
Congress has established. 166
The issue here relates to the third requirement - CSC contracts are not
grouped into one single government obligation. They are separate contracts.
The government has an obligation to each and every tribe that has a CSC
agreement. The Court correctly acknowledged that a lump-sum
appropriation, not a line-item appropriation, was made to pay the
contracts. 16 7 Consequently, when looking at the issue of legal availability,
the CSC contracts cannot be grouped together under the analysis of a lineitem appropriation. The government's obligation to the appellants was
within the amount of the appropriation, and there was no restriction that
prohibited the agency from fulfilling its obligation. There was money from
the lump-sum appropriation legally available to pay the appellants.
3. "Subject to the Availability ofAppropriations"
The Supreme Court correctly held that the "subject to the availability of
appropriations" provision should be given its traditional interpretation. This
means that contractors and agencies may negotiate the terms of the contract
prior to the fiscal year but the contract will not become binding until
Congress appropriates funds for that year.168 "Subject to the availability of
appropriations" in the ISDA and contract only asks whether the government
is able to "pay a particular tribe's CSCs, not its ability to pay all tribes'

CSCs." 1 69
The phrase is a term of art common in many government contracts. In
Cherokee, the Supreme Court affirmed the traditional meaning of the

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 4-6.
Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2190 (2012).
Id. at2191; see Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 643 (2005).
Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011).
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phrase.170 The government's interpretation, that this phrase unambiguously
absolves them of any liability in excess of the appropriation, flies in the
face of both settled Supreme Court jurisprudence and the ISDA's policy of
treating CSC agreements as ordinary contracts instead of "entitlements," as
the government argued. 17 1
The phrase "subject to the availability of appropriations" found in the
ISDA was given its traditional interpretation by the Supreme Court in
Cherokee. The special circumstances cited in CH. Leavell v. United States
and Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. United States are not present in
Ramah and Arctic Slope.' 7 2 The phrase simply means that tribes and
agencies were free to determine the terms of the CSC contracts before the
beginning of the fiscal year and those terms became binding once Congress
appropriated the funds.173
C. Remedies
The Supreme Court correctly held that because Cherokee and Ferris
apply, and the government is legally liable, the appropriate remedy is to pay
the unfunded portion of CSCs through the CDA and Judgment fund.17 4 The
statutory cap does not preclude recovery of money in excess of the cap.
The government argued that the cap, along with the Appropriations
Clause175 and the Anti-Deficiency Act,' 6 should preclude recovery in

170. Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 643.
171. Brief for Appellee at 11, Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054 (2011)
(No. 08-2262).
172. C.H. Leavell & Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 878, 894 (1976) (stating that the
agreement in C.H. Leavell contained a maximum payment of $75,000 for pile-driving work).
The distinguishing factor is the provision in the contract which states that "it is distinctly
understood and agreed that the amount of funds ... is the maximum amount the government
insures will be available . . . and the Government is in no case liable for payments ...
beyond this amount." Id. The contract provision unambiguously altered the terms of the
contract beyond the traditional meaning of "subject to the availability of appropriations."
Id.; Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. United States, 622 F.2d 539, 543 (Ct. Cl. 1980)
(stating that the issue of the availability language was explicitly discussed throughout the
negotiations). The Government's attorney was surprised that a contractor would assent to the
availability clause so easily, so he explicitly told the contractor that if Congress acted to
prevent the agency from paying, they would not be held liable. In response, the contractor
shrugged and the agreement was signed. Id.
173. Cherokee, 543 U.S. at 643; see 1 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 126, at 4-6.
174. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2193-94 (2012).
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
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excess of the amount stipulated by the statutory cap.' 77 However, "the
United States' liability is not coterminous with the [Agency's] ability to
pay ... [and] the Anti-Deficiency Act [does not] . . . 'affect the rights in
this court of the citizen honestly contracting with the government."" 78
The ISDA states that the CDA applies to self-determination contracts.' 79
The CDA is the primary method that contractors use to resolve disputes
with the government.'8 Judgments made under the CDA are paid through
the Judgment Fund.181 The Judgment Fund allows funds to be appropriated
to pay for "judgments, awards, [and] compromise settlements .

. ."

if the

money has not already been appropriated.182
The legislature intended that the CDA and Judgment Fund be used to pay
tribes the money they contracted for, but have not received due to a breach
by the government. The Judgment Fund should be used to make an
appropriation that is the difference between the contract amount and the
insufficient appropriation. An appropriation through the CDA and
Judgment Fund would resolve any issues relating to the Appropriations
Clause and the ADA.18 3
VII. Recommendations to Congress: Actions Following the Ramah Decision
There are a number of methods agencies and Congress could implement
to fulfill their requirements under the ISDA and the recent Supreme Court
ruling in Ramah.
Congress could make line-item appropriations for each contract, continue
its system of underfunding CSCs with the difference to come out of the
Judgment Fund, begin to pay the full amount of CSCs in keeping with the
spirit and text of the ISDA, or alter the text of the ISDA to remove language
that treats CSC contracts as traditional contracts and insert language that
requires full funding.
176. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006) ("An officer or employee of the United States
Government .. . may not (A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an
amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation; (B) involve
[the] government in a contract or obligation for the payment of money before an
appropriation is made unless authorized by law .... .).
177. See Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1076 (2011).
178. Id. (quoting Dougherty ex rel. Slavens v. United States, 18 Ct. Cl. 496, 503 (1883)).
179. 25 U.S.C. § 450m-1(d) (2006).
180. See 15B FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER's EDMON § 39:786 (2011).
181. 41 U.S.C. § 612 (2006) (recodified as 41 U.S.C. § 7108, effective Jan. 4,2011).
182. 31 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(1) (2006).
183. Ramah, 644 F.3d at 1076.
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A. Line-Item Appropriations
Congress is free to make line-item appropriations for individual CSC
contracts. Although this solution would deprive tribes of full CSC funding,
if Congress is intent on under funding CSCs, this is probably the easiest
way to do so. Line-item appropriations receive different treatment under
government contract law. Unlike a lump-sum appropriation, if Congress
makes a line-item appropriation, contractors are deemed to have notice of
the shortfall and generally do not have any right to recovery. 8 4 In
Cherokee, the Supreme Court recognized this distinction and suggested that
a line-item appropriation, also known as a statutory earmark, was a proper
way to assign a specific amount of money for each contract, even if it is less
than the amount specified in the contract.' 85 Nothing has changed since
Cherokee. This approach is a legal way for Congress to underfund CSC
contracts.
The government found this proposition to be "extraordinary.""' But
there is nothing extraordinary about requiring Congress, when they want to
underpay their contractual obligations by more than $1 billion, to list the
specific amount they will appropriate for each CSC contract. 187 With the
vast amount of congressional resources, it would not be an extraordinary
task.
B. Continue Underfundingor Alter the ISDA
Congress is free to continue underfunding CSC contracts and tribes can
recover the deficiency from the Judgment Fund. Also, Congress could strip
the ISDA of language that treats CSC agreements as contractual
obligations. Because the Contract Disputes Act applies to disputes arising
out of the ISDA, if Congress chose to make no changes to their approach,

184. 2 GAO REDBOOK, supra note 126, at 6-44 to 6-45 ("[I]t is settled that contractors
paid from a general appropriation [lump-sum appropriation] are not barred from recovering
for breach of contract even though the appropriation is exhausted. However, under a specific
line-item appropriation, the answer is different. The contractor in this situation is deemed to
have notice of the limits on the spending power of the government official with whom he
contracts. A contract under these circumstances is valid only up to the amount of the
available appropriation. Exhaustion of the appropriation will generally bar any further
recovery beyond that limit.").
185. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 642 (2005) ("[Tlhe law normally
expects the Government to avoid such situations, for example, . . . by asking Congress in
advance to protect funds needed for more essential purposes with statutory earmarks . . .
186. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 29.
187. Id.
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tribes could recover unpaid portions of CSC costs through the Judgment
Fund. This is the outcome the Supreme Court chose in Ramah.
While this is a possible outcome the courts can reach, it is far from the
best outcome for future CSC dispute cases. As the Tenth Circuit stated, it is
an "inefficient system of compensation. . ." but courts must still enforce the
88
"legal effects of Congress'[s] intentional acts."'
If Congress is intent on paying less than the full amount of CSC costs,
Congress can also alter the text of the ISDA to strip language classifying
CSC agreements as contracts and make it explicit that the government is not
required to fund the full amount of CSC contracts. The government
recognizes that the more than $1 billion in unfunded CSCs is an important
issue. While this would be a significant act on the part of Congress, if
they decide CSC contracts are no longer worth funding in full, action equal
to the importance of the issue is warranted.
While Congress certainly has the right to make fundamental changes to
the ISDA, it is an action that would have dire consequences. It may
effectively jeopardize the Self-Determination Era. The Self-Determination
Era is widely considered to be the most successful period of relations
between Native Americans and the federal government. Funding of CSC
contracts is an important part of this. As discussed, CSCs are vital to the
successful operation of tribal programs at the heart of the SelfDetermination Era. An action that alters the effectiveness of or eliminates
programs supported by CSCs threatens the future of the Self-Determination
Era.

C. Full Payment of CSCs
Congress should pay the full amount of CSC requests to ensure the
continued success of the ISDA and Self-Determination Era, and to uphold
the spirit of the Supreme Court's Ramah decision. The best outcome would
be for Congress to fulfill their contractual commitments, adhere to the spirit
and text of the ISDA, and pay the full amount of their CSC obligations.
This may be unrealistic given the tumultuous history of CSC disputes.
However, when Congress passed the 1988 amendments to the ISDA, they
recognized the importance CSC costs have to the success of the SelfDetermination Era.190 The Committee on Indian Affairs went so far as to
say "[flull funding of tribal indirect costs associated with self-determination
contracts is essential if the federal policy of Indian Self-Determination is to
188. Ramah, 644 F.3d at 1077.
189. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 17, at 29.
190. See S. REP. No. 100-274, at 13 (1987).
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succeed." 9 ' Surely Indians who depend on vital tribal programs feel the
same. 9 2
As the Supreme Court noted in Ramah, there is hope that Congress will
fully fund CSCs.193 But given the history surrounding this issue, it is
reasonable to be skeptical of this hope. Tribes and other interested parties
must remain vigilant to ensure these vital costs are fully funded.
VIII. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in Ramah resolved a decades-long
struggle of how to deal with underfunded CSCs. The decision supported the
principles of the Self-Determination Era and reflected a need to maintain
stability between tribes and the federal government. However, the legal
principles advanced in Ramah only represent half the battle. The $1 billion
in unfunded CSCs threatens to hinder the success of the Self-Determination
Era in the future.
The law requires that CSC contracts be paid in full. The existence of a
statutory cap does not alter this outcome. Congress could have easily
earmarked a specific amount of money to be paid to each tribe. Instead,
Congress made an unrestricted lump-sum appropriation that was not
sufficient to cover all of their obligations. Due to the contractual nature of
the agreements, the obligations did not go away. The agencies were still
free to allocate the money in any manner they felt appropriate. They could
have fulfilled the government's obligations just as easily as they made the
decision to distribute the money on a pro rata basis. Of course, the agencies
would never have been able to pay the full amount on all CSC contracts;
however, the agencies' "liability is not coterminous with [their] ability to
pay."'9 4
The statutory cap simply changes the source of recovery. Because of the
cap, tribes cannot recover from the larger appropriation from which the
CSC contract appropriation derived. Importantly, the ISDA intentionally
191. Id.(emphasis added).
192. Elizabeth M. Glazer, Comment, Appropriating Availability: Reconciling Purpose
and Text Under the Indian Self-Determinationand Education Assistance Act, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1637, 1645 (2004).
193. Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181, 2195 (2012) ("The Committee
believes that the Bureau should pay all contract support costs for which it has contractually
agreed and directs the Bureau to include the full cost of the contract support obligationsin
its fiscal year 2013 budget submission." (quoting H.R. REP. No. 112-151, at 42 (2011))
(emphasis added)).
194. Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar, 644 F.3d 1054, 1076 (10th Cir. 2011).
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provides another source of recovery tailor-made for the situation. It is
entirely appropriate to pay the remainder of the CSCs through the CDA and
Judgment Fund.
As the judiciary passes its duty on to the legislative branch, uncertainty
abounds. How will Congress implement the principles of Ramah? If history
is any indication, it is unlikely that Congress will fully fund CSCs.
Hopefully, Congress and executive agencies will realize the importance of
CSCs to Native Americans and fully fund them. CSCs are costs necessary
to support vital programs in communities throughout the country. Anything
less than full funding of CSCs burdens Native American communities and
tribal trust in government contracting.
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